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1 Introduction
In the Japanese Keiretsu, production relies heavily on sub-contracting. Perrow (1992)
reports that Japanese firms deal directly with between 100 to 300 contractors who them-
selves deal in turn with up to 5000 sub-contractors. Clearly, the large number of partners
involved at each layer of contracting makes any direct control of the relationship between
contractors by the top firms almost impossible. Nevertheless, top firms devote much at-
tention to building up their network of suppliers. Toyota is an emblematic exemple in that
respect. As illustrated by Hines and Rich (1998), Toyota was particularly successful in
outsourcing a major part of its competitive advantage to its network of direct and indirect
suppliers. This performance is partially explained by a specific organization of suppliers
named kyoryoku kai or supplier associations. These associations have their roots in the
late 1930s with the grouping of twenty of the major Toyota suppliers. Over time these
associations have developed to involve almost all Toyota suppliers in the first, second
and third tiers of supply. While encouraging such associations, Toyota is not necessarily
involved in their day to day functioning. Instead, leadership is delegated to important
direct suppliers. The kyoryoku kai promotes integration activities among members such as
top management group meetings, quality awards and audits, and tries to achieve thereby
a better coordination through information exchanges. Such flows of information were not
present at that scale in other forms of supplier-buyer relationships and should be viewed
as the key factor explaining Toyota achievement. As argued by Baiman and Rajan (2002),
the amount of information exchanged among subcontractors is what really distinguishes
supplier networks from more traditional arm’s length relationships.
Beyond the Toyota example, the design of efficient supplier networks has been a ma-
jor issue across the whole automotive industry. For instance, it is generally acknowledged
that one definitive advantage of Ford over General Motors was obtained by reorganizing
the supply chain. With this reorganization, Ford kept only relationships with contrac-
tors in charge of assembling parts built by other sub-contractors, and left to those con-
tractors the choice of the degree of control and coordination they would like with their
sub-contractors. In recent years, this model has been spread over other industries: the
computer and electronics industries or the e-commerce sector have now become intensive
users of supplier networks.1 Despite its practical importance, determining under which
conditions such networks emerge remains a theoretical question by large still unsettled.
Answering this question is of considerable importance in view of the lively debate among
both management scholars and practitioners over the organization of the whole supply
chain.
This paper tackles this issue. We present a theory of the optimal organization of
1See Baiman and Rajan (2002).
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supplier networks based on the private incentives of the suppliers bringing complemen-
tary resources to the organization to either consolidate their private information on their
technological capabilities or to remain independent units contracting at arm’s length. In
organizing the network of its suppliers, a firm faces a trade-off between providing in-
centives for costly information sharing among those suppliers and benefiting from the
efficiency gains that such close-knit relationships generate. To exhaust those gains, con-
tracts with suppliers must induce the right amount of information sharing even though
sub-contracting is delegated to intermediate contractors. This paper analyzes how the
choice of the optimal degree of information sharing interacts with information flows to
determine the performances of various contracting modes.
To model supplier networks, we envision the top firm as facing suppliers who are pri-
vately informed about their own production costs. This top firm is unable to recommend
directly the degree of consolidation between these suppliers. Instead, it must induce the
optimal degree of information sharing from its own viewpoint. Credible information shar-
ing requires that one supplier, the contractor, monitors the sub-contractor. Instead of
investing in an efficient and close relationship with a partner, the contractor could pos-
sibly save on these monitoring costs and contract at arm’s length with an independent
sub-contractor. Of course, this organizational choice (de facto delegated to the contrac-
tor) may differ from what would be chosen by the top firm itself. Inducing information
sharing has thus the flavor of a moral hazard problem. Taking into account this dimension
of the contractor’s strategy is in line with some empirical studies. Yun (1999), in a study
of the Korean automotive industry emphasized that the negotiated contracts between the
contractor and the subcontractors are based on estimates of the subcontractors’ costs
which are obtained by the contractor through audit or accounting data analysis.
Since the organizational choice affects the degree of informational asymmetries that the
top firm faces in front of its suppliers, it also affects information flows in the organization
and the trade-off between allocative efficiency and rent extraction that arises in adverse
selection environments. In designing the contours of the organization, the top firm faces
a complex incentive problem which thus mixes moral hazard and adverse selection.
This paper generates two sets of results. On the one hand, we offer a unified framework
which derives various organizational forms which have been studied in isolation within the
received literature as being solutions to the same design problem for different values of
the cost of information sharing. On the other hand, we offer a measure of the control loss
incurred by the principal in delegating organizational choice to contractors and highlight a
systematic bias towards too much arm’s length contracting and not enough consolidation.
To understand the first set of results, it is rather intuitive to see that, as the fixed-cost
of monitoring increases, efficiency gains may not be enough to always justify information
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sharing (consolidation) and the principal may prefer that suppliers remain at arm’s length
(delegation). Under delegation, information on sub-contractors is indirectly learned by
the contractor through an incentive compatible contract. Because of this maintained
asymmetry of information between agents, delegation entails more allocative inefficiency
than consolidation but it also saves on the fixed-cost of monitoring.
Because of monitoring fixed-cost and non-convexities, a marginal shift in exogenous
technological or preferences parameters may create significant discontinuities in the opti-
mal incentive schemes and outputs chosen within the organization. One cannot expect a
whole continuum of organizational forms to emerge as structural parameters of the model
are slightly perturbed. Instead only a discrete number of organizations distinguished by
their production and their degree of consolidation emerge in equilibrium.
As the fixed-cost of monitoring increases, the degree of consolidation of the optimal
organization diminishes. Mixed organizations emerge when consolidation is chosen only
by efficient contractors whereas arm’s length contracting is preferred by inefficient ones.
The top firm’s profit nevertheless varies continuously when one moves from a fully consoli-
dated organization, to a partially consolidated one, to finally reach values of the fixed-cost
where arm’s length contracting is always preferred. Our model predicts thus that organi-
zations where arm’s length contracting prevails yield also lower profits than consolidated
organizations.
The existence of the partially consolidated organization illustrates the fact that the
preferred organizational form can be influenced by the efficiency of the contractor. In
our model, different choices of monitoring intensities among a set of otherwise identical
firms can be explained by a difference in the corresponding contractors’ efficiency. The
channel through which productive efficiency of the contractor has an impact on its deci-
sion to monitor is called the efficiency effect and can be explained as follows. To solve
optimally the efficiency-rent extraction trade-off of the overall organization, the top firm
has to link the total production and the efficiency of the contractor. But due to the
complementarity of the inputs, increasing total production means increasing production
of the sub-contractor which in turn means a higher rent for the sub-contractor in case it
is not monitored. As a consequence, a more efficient contractor has more incentives to
monitor.
To understand the control loss incurred by the principal when he delegates the organi-
zational choice to the contractor, it is important to see that, the principal could increase
his screening ability when monitoring the sub-contractor by himself. When monitoring
is delegated, some of its gains are dissipated under the form of extra information rents
to the contractor coming from a better coordination in manipulating information to the
principal. As a result, consolidation is more attractive when the principal does monitor
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by himself. When the decision to monitor is delegated to the contractor, there may be
too much arm’s length contracting.
Taking care of the endogenity of information structures, we give a fresh look to the
standard trade-off between allocative efficiency and rent extraction in multi-agent orga-
nizations. Earlier works on multi-agent organizations include Baron and Besanko (1992),
Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995), Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (2001) among others. Those authors have shown that delegation entails
no loss of generality from the principal’s viewpoint. Indeed, the principal achieves the
same expected payoff as under centralized contracting, i.e., if he could directly contract
with both agents and forbid any communication between them.2 However, as shown in
Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995), consolidation performs better
than delegation. Inducing information sharing between the agents benefits the principal.
To understand why consolidation does not necessarily emerge, one must endogenize the
information structure and model explicitly the incentives to create such a consolidated
organization. To the best of our knowledge, only Baron and Besanko (1999) have tackled
this issue so far. They study the incentives to consolidate when agents can opt out to
contract independently with the principal. In their model, the principal takes into account
this outside option and offers to the agents enough information rent to let consolidation
form so that he benefits from its greater allocative efficiency. Binding outside options
lead nevertheless to new output distortions and diminish the benefits of consolidation.
A first difference with their paper is that we model explicitly the agent’s incentives to
monitor his peer. A second difference comes from the fact that we restore the Stackelberg
leadership of the principal who wants to offer the best conditions for the emergence of an
efficient network of suppliers.
With respect to all the existing literature on delegation and consolidation, our paper
is the first one to encompass within the same model these two organizational forms and
to derive them as solutions to the same optimization problem for different values of the
monitoring cost.
There is a distinct literature on monitoring in three-layer hierarchies which, following
Tirole (1986), assumes that the monitor does not produce and learns exogenously a pa-
rameter which is privately known by the productive agent. These papers study settings
where supervisory information is either hard as in Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Kofman
and Lawarre´e (1993) or soft as in Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) and
analyze collusion between the monitor and the agent. We consider soft information but,
by contrast, the information learned by the contractor is endogenously determined by
2Laffont and Martimort (1997 and 1998) have also shown that, in an environment with independent
productive shocks, lateral communication and collusion between the agents would be costless for the
principal which could fight this collusion by a clever design of the agents’ incentive schemes.
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the incentive structure.3 Moreover, we are particularly interested in situations in which
monitoring is delegated to a productive agent. This gives us a natural model to study the
supply chain and identify interesting interactions between the supervisory and productive
roles of the contractor.
Section 2 presents the model and provides useful benchmarks: costless consolidation
and delegation. In Section 3, we derive the agency cost faced by the principal when
he delegates the choice on whether monitoring or contracting arm’s length to a contrac-
tor. We then discuss the principal’s optimal organizational choice. Section 4 provides
some extensions of our basic framework and discusses the benefits of a fully centralized
organization. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Model and Benchmarks
• Agents and Organizations: We consider an organization involving one top firm or
principal P and two suppliers or agents A1 and A2. Agents produce essential inputs qi
(i = 1, 2) for the organization. These inputs are perfect complements so that q = q1 = q2
denotes the final output of the organization. Each agent has private information on his
constant marginal cost θi. Both costs are independently drawn from the same common
knowledge distribution on Θ = {θ, θ¯} (with ∆θ = θ¯− θ > 0) with respective probabilities
ν and 1−ν. The utility function of Ai is Ui = zi−θiq where zi is the net monetary transfer
received by Ai. Principal P contracts directly with the contractor A1 and delegates to
him the task of contracting with the sub-contractor A2. Since A1 receives a transfer t
from the principal P and gives back a transfer y to A2, we have z1 = t − y and z2 = y.
Finally, each agent has a reservation payoff normalized to zero.
The principal’s profit is V = S(q) − t where S(·) is increasing and concave (S ′ > 0,
S ′′ < 0) and satisfies the Inada conditions (S ′(0) = +∞, S ′(+∞) = 0) with S(0) = 0.
Under complete information, the first-best outputs are such that marginal benefit equals
marginal cost: S ′(q∗(θ1, θ2)) = θ1 + θ2.
On top of his productive role, the contractor A1 can also monitor the sub-contractor
A2. A1 learns perfectly A2’s efficiency parameter if he incurs a fixed-cost c. We assume
that c does not depend on A1’s efficiency.
4 A1’s information on A2 is soft, i.e., it is not
possible to transmit it credibly to the principal. The benefit of using A1 as a monitor
comes from his comparative advantage in monitoring A2.
The network of suppliers has close links when those monitoring costs are incurred. As
3Strausz (1997) considers endogenous but hard information.
4This assumption suppresses one simple possible impact of A1’s efficiency on its decision to monitor
and allows us to identify clearly the efficiency effect stressed below.
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in the literature on network formations,5 this gives the contractor access to the profits
available to the downstream supplier and drives its incentives to form such a link.
Without loss of generality, P ’s grand-contract offered to A1 is a truthful direct mech-
anism GC = {t(Φˆ); q(Φˆ)} where t(·) is A1’s transfer received by P , q(·) is the output
produced and Φˆ is the report made by A1 on all information that he has learned by
sub-contracting with A2, i.e., on the whole vector of cost parameters (θ1, θ2). For con-
venience, we denote outputs by q = q(θ, θ), qˆ1 = q(θ, θ¯), qˆ2 = q(θ¯, θ) and q¯ = q(θ¯, θ¯). To
express the incentive and participation constraints in a simple way, it is useful to define
the complete information payoff of the (A1, A2) coalition in the various states of nature
as u = t(θ, θ) − 2θq, uˆ1 = t(θ, θ¯) − (θ + θ¯)qˆ1, uˆ2 = t(θ¯, θ) − (θ + θ¯)qˆ2, u¯ = t(θ¯, θ¯) − 2θ¯q¯.
Instead of reasoning over transfers and outputs, we will repeatedly use rent-output pairs
to illustrate the trade-offs between allocative efficiency and rent extraction in the different
organizational forms.
• Timing: It is described on Figure 1 below.
? ? ? ? ? ?
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
Ai learns θi
i ∈ {1, 2}
P proposes a
grand-contract
to A1
A1 accepts
or refuses the
grand-contract
A1 decides to
monitor or not A2
A1 proposes a
sub-contract
to A2
A2 accepts
or refuses the
sub-contract,
then production
and transfers
take place
-
Figure 1: Timing.
This sequence of events corresponds to the case where the contractor accepts the
project before meeting with input suppliers. This timing is particularly relevant for a
long-lasting project which commits suppliers for a long period of time. The suppliers
arrange then their organization as a best response to the procurement contract proposed
by the top firm.
• Costless Consolidation and Delegation: Two polar situations have been stressed
by the existing literature: costless consolidation and delegation. 6 We can conduct their
5See Jackson and Wolinski (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000) and Kranton and Minehart (2001) among
others. Contrary to this literature which neglects the issue of information, we stress the information role
of building close relationships.
6Most of the existing literature relied on a framework with a continuum of types which turns out to
be quite difficult to use when one wants to analyze the incentives to monitor or not. We recast below the
results of the literature in a discrete type environment.
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analysis in parallel, using the notion of virtual cost to take into account the informational
rents. Under costless consolidation, A1 learns for free A2’s type at date t = 3, while
under delegation, A1 stays uninformed. The sub-contracting game is thus different in
the two cases. In the costless consolidation case, A1 does not have to let a rent to A2
and just reimburses A2 for its true cost (θ or θ¯). Under delegation, A1 must design
an incentive compatible sub-contract and A2 keeps an informational rent. In that case
A1 has to reimburse A2 for its virtual costs (θ or θ¯ +
ν
1−ν∆θ) which are bigger than
true costs. Anticipating this, A1 behaves in the grand-contract as if its true costs were
(2θ, θ+ θ¯, θ¯+ θ, 2θ¯) under costless consolidation, or (2θ, θ+ θ¯+ ν
1−ν∆θ, θ¯+ θ, 2θ¯+
ν
1−ν∆θ)
under delegation. Apart from this difference, the two maximization programs faced by
P at date t = 1 are similar. As usual in the screening literature, (coalition) incentive
constraints are binding upwards. The relevant ones prevent a coalition from pretending
being less efficient than what it is. The binding participation constraint is for the less
efficient coalition. Finally, mixed coalitions are not screened apart: (uˆ1, qˆ1) = (uˆ2, qˆ2) =
(uˆ, qˆ).
Under costless consolidation, the optimal grand-contract is thus solution to:
(PC) : max
{(u,q);(uˆ,qˆ);(u¯,q¯)}
ν2(S(q)−2θq−u)+2ν(1−ν)(S(qˆ)−(θ+θ¯)qˆ−uˆ)+(1−ν)2(S(q¯)−2θ¯q¯−u¯)
subject to
u ≥ uˆ+ ∆θqˆ, (1)
uˆ ≥ u¯+ ∆θq¯. (2)
U¯1 = νuˆ+ (1− ν)u¯ ≥ 0. (3)
The costless consolidation analyzed above slightly differs from the model used in the
literature in terms of the timing for its formation. As one can see by comparing the
participation constraints (3) and (5), this difference allows us to keep the delegation and
consolidation organizations as close as possible.
Under delegation, the principal’s problem becomes:
(PD) : max
{(u,q);(uˆ,qˆ);(u¯,q¯)}
ν2(S(q)−2θq−u)+2ν(1−ν)(S(qˆ)−(θ+θ¯)qˆ−uˆ)+(1−ν)2(S(q¯)−2θ¯q¯−u¯)
subject to
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u ≥ uˆ+ ∆θqˆ,
uˆ ≥ u¯+ ∆θq¯ + ν
1− ν∆θ(qˆ − q¯). (4)
U¯1 = ν(uˆ−∆θq¯) + (1− ν)u¯ ≥ 0. (5)
The solution to these programs is straightforward and summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 • The optimal grand-contract under costless consolidation entails:
Only the efficient agent A1 gets a positive interim information rent
UC1 = ∆θ(νqˆ
C + (1− ν)q¯C) > 0 and U¯C1 = 0; (6)
There is no output distortion with respect to the first-best for a (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ)-coalition,
qC = q∗(2θ) and a downward distortion below the first-best otherwise;
S ′(qˆC) = θ + θ¯ +
ν
2(1− ν)∆θ, and S
′(q¯C) = 2θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ. (7)
• The optimal grand-contract under delegation entails:
Only the efficient agents A1 and A2 get a positive information rent which is the same:
UDi = ∆θ(νqˆ
D + (1− ν)q¯D), and U¯Di = 0 for i = 1, 2; (8)
The optimal schedule of outputs yields the same first-best level of production as under
consolidation for a (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ)-coalition q
D = qC = q∗(2θ) and downward distortions
compared to consolidation for the other quantities qˆD < qˆC and q¯D < q¯C with:
S ′(qˆD) = θ + θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ and S
′(q¯D) = 2θ¯ +
2ν
1− ν∆θ. (9)
• If the principal could directly contract and communicate with both suppliers, he would
optimally implement the same quantities and rents as under delegation.
It is straightforward to observe that delegation yields a lower profit to the principal than
what he can get through a costless consolidation. Indeed, denoting by V C(q, qˆ, q¯) and
V D(q, qˆ, q¯) the corresponding expected profits for any given schedule of outputs (q, qˆ, q¯),
V C(q, qˆ, q¯) = V ∗(q, qˆ, q¯)− ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯),
V D(q, qˆ, q¯) = V ∗(q, qˆ, q¯)− 2ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯),
where V ∗(q, qˆ, q¯) = ν2(S(q)−2θq)+2ν(1−ν)(S(qˆ)− (θ+ θ¯)qˆ)+(1−ν)2(S(q¯)−2θ¯q¯) is the
complete information profit achieved by the principal when implementing any schedule
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of outputs (q, qˆ, q¯). For further references, we denote by V C = V C(qC , qˆC , q¯C) and V D =
V D(qD, qˆD, q¯D) the optimal profits achieved under costless consolidation and delegation.
The second terms in the expression of V C(q, qˆ, q¯) and V D(q, qˆ, q¯) represent the agency costs
incurred in both cases. Agency costs under delegation are twice those under consolidation.
Intuitively, the fact that both agents retain now private information duplicates information
rents and hardens the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction.7
The consolidated organization can be viewed as having a high degree of integration.8
Complete information between suppliers facilitates the coordination of their production
decisions and creates scope for efficiency gains along the supply chain. Coming back to
the introductory example of Toyota, some of the kyoryoku kai are actively organized by
direct suppliers such as Denso or Aisin and regroup their own sub-contractors. Consolida-
tion is then achieved (at least partially) through audits, meetings with top management
or informal coordination activities. On the other side, delegation in our model refers
to what is generally called arm’s length contracting and corresponds to more traditional
contractor-subcontractor relationships with the contractor being less involved in coordi-
nation activities and productive information being transmitted only indirectly through
incentive schemes.
3 Comparison between Organizational Forms
Let us now suppose that A1 can directly acquire perfect information on A2’s type at a
finite cost c.9 This cost of monitoring may represent time and resources spent to per-
form accounting audits, to organize top-management information sharing or to undertake
technological intelligence. It is likely to vary across industries and is certainly the higher
the more technologically different the activities of the contractor and the subcontractor
are. At the time of incurring this cost, A1 anticipates that direct monitoring saves on the
information rent that he would have to leave to A2 if he chose instead to stay at arm’s
length with the sub-contractor. When A1 is efficient (resp. inefficient), monitoring A2
costs c instead of the information rent ν∆θqˆ (resp. ν∆θq¯) that A1 must give up to A2
under arm’s length contracting. A1’s choice between monitoring or contracting at arm’s
length with A2 depends thus on his own type since this efficiency parameter affects pro-
7The reader will have recognized the similarity of this argument with the double-marginalization effect
of the I.O. literature (see Spengler (1950)).
8The literature on vertical integration has often pointed out that integration changes the informational
structure, arguing that information is better obtained between integrated units rather than on market
relationships. See Arrow (1975) and Riordan (1990). This literature has nevertheless focused on the
incentives to make or buy in a two-agent context whereas the present paper is more interested in the
incentive problem related to that choice when it affects a principal.
9The fact that acquired information is perfect distinguishes our model from the standard auditing
literature (see Mookherjee and Png, 1989 or Strausz, 1997).
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duction and thus the information rent left to A2. This is the efficiency effect. Note also
that, no matter how information on A2 is learned by A1, this is the principal who in fine
bears the cost of learning. This cost affects the overall agency cost that the principal has
to pay when he wants to implement a given production schedule (q, qˆ, q¯).10 Noticing that
the cost of truthful revelation by A1 is, as under delegation, the expected information
rent left to him, namely ν∆θ(νqˆ+ (1−ν)q¯), the overall agency cost can thus a priori take
four different expressions:
Case 1: Suppose that A1 always monitors A2, the agency cost borne by the principal
for implementing outputs (q, qˆ, q¯) is c+ ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯).
Case 2: If A1 monitors A2 only when he is efficient θ1 = θ, the agency cost becomes
ν(c+ (1− ν)∆θq¯) + ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯).
Case 3: If A1 always contracts at arm’s length with A2, the agency cost is the same
as under delegation, namely 2ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯).
Case 4: The remaining possibility would be that only the inefficient contractor mon-
itors. As we show below, the principal never chooses to induce monitoring only by the
inefficient contractor. The intuition is straightforward. Since A2’s information rent is
greater when the output is greater, A1 is more willing to monitor his peer when he is
efficient since the coalition must produce more and the rent left to A2 is larger. Thus,
if A1 monitors his peer when he is inefficient, he necessarily also monitors when he is
efficient.
Gathering the three relevant cases, the total agency cost is finally written as:
C(q, qˆ, q¯) = ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯) + min{c, ν(c+ (1− ν)∆θq¯), ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯)}. (10)
Although this derivation of the agency cost is rather intuitive, it is not fully rigorous.
We must verify that the interplay between the moral hazard and the adverse selection
dimensions of the incentive problem does lead to such an agency cost.
Consider for instance Case 1 where the principal wants to induce monitoring by agent
A1. Coalition incentive constraints are then written as under complete information. Par-
ticipation constraints must nevertheless be adapted to take into account that A1 incurs
a fixed-cost of monitoring and must be reimbursed for doing so by the principal. The
inefficient agent A1’s participation constraint is now:
U¯1 = νuˆ+ (1− ν)u¯− c ≥ 0. (11)
When accepting the contract proposed by the principal, the contractor must expect a
positive payoff anticipating that he will monitor the sub-contractor.
10Restricting attention to quantity schedules such that qˆ1 = qˆ2 is without loss of generality as we prove
in the Appendix.
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Whatever his own type, A1 must also be induced to monitor A2. This yields the
following type-by-type moral hazard constraints of A1: for the efficient type θ1 = θ,
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ− c ≥ (12)
max
{Φ(θ,θ);Φ(θ,θ¯)}
{
ν (t(Φ(θ, θ))− 2θq(Φ(θ, θ))) + (1− ν)
(
t(Φ(θ, θ¯))−
(
θ + θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ
)
q(Φ(θ, θ¯))
)}
,
and for the inefficient type θ1 = θ¯,
νuˆ+ (1− ν)u¯− c ≥ (13)
max
{Φ(θ¯,θ);Φ(θ¯,θ¯)}
{
ν
(
t(Φ(θ¯, θ))− (θ + θ¯)q(Φ(θ¯, θ)))+ (1− ν)(t(Φ(θ¯, θ¯))− (2θ¯ + ν
1− ν∆θ
)
q(Φ(θ¯, θ¯))
)}
.
The r.h.s. of (12) and (13) represent what A1 obtains if he does not monitor A2. In
this case, A1 has to learn indirectly A2’s type through arm’s length contracting and he
must give up to A2 some information rent to do so. To evaluate the benefit of reaching
an optimal sub-contract with A2 under these circumstances, one must replace the cost of
A2 by its virtual cost in the r.h.s. of (12) and (13).
11 Consider first the moral hazard
constraint for an inefficient agent A1 and let us try to simplify it. To do so, we must
figure out what are the productions chosen under sub-contracting if A1 does not monitor
A2, given that the principal anticipates that monitoring actually occurs. Remember that,
in that case, the coalition produces efficiently and large volumes are expected. If an
inefficient agent A1 does not monitor, the optimal arm’s length contract maximizes the
virtual surplus of the coalition which is lower than its true surplus. A revealed preference
argument shows immediately that, under asymmetric information, the (θ¯, θ¯)-coalition
is certainly not willing to produce more than q¯. Hence, Φ∗(θ¯, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯) is the best
manipulation out of the equilibrium path. When A1 faces an efficient agent A2, the virtual
surplus of the coalition is instead equal to the true surplus. The production is the same
in state (θ¯, θ) whether there is complete or asymmetric information within the coalition:
Φ∗(θ¯, θ) = (θ¯, θ). For an inefficient agent A1, the best manipulation out of the equilibrium
remains to truthfully report the cost vector to the principal. The incentive constraint (13)
is then satisfied when the rent left to an efficient agent A2, namely ∆θq(Φ
∗(θ¯, θ¯)) = ∆θq¯,
is greater than the fixed cost of monitoring:
c ≤ ν∆θq¯ (14)
11When deriving (12) and (13), an extensive use is made of Maskin and Tirole (1990). The subcontract-
ing stage following any monitoring decision by A1 can be analyzed as an informed principal problem in a
setting with private values and quasi-linear preferences. We know from the work of these authors that the
continuation equilibrium following any monitoring decision by A1 does not depend on A2’s beliefs on A1’s
type. It is thus equivalent to consider that A2 knows perfectly A1’s type in the subcontracting game. This
allows us to derive the moral hazard constraints without worrying about the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
that A2 may hold following an unexpected action of A1.
11
Comparing (12) and (13), the most stringent moral hazard constraint is (13) which con-
cerns the inefficient contractor. Surplus losses from arm’s length contracting being greater
when A1 is efficient, (12) is easier to satisfy than (14) so that the only moral hazard prob-
lem comes from an inefficient A1. This also eliminates Case 4.
Finally, a contract inducing consolidation implements a schedule of outputs (q, qˆ, q¯) at
a cost C1(q, qˆ, q¯) which is solution to:
12
C1(q, qˆ, q¯) = min{u,uˆ,u¯}
ν2u+ 2ν(1− ν)uˆ+ (1− ν)2u¯
subject to (1), (2), (11) and (14).
We show in the Appendix that this cost function can in fact be written as:
C1(q, qˆ, q¯) = c+ ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯)
under the restriction c ≤ ν∆θq¯.
Everything happens thus as if A1 is reimbursed a fixed amount c for the fixed-cost
of monitoring and, on top of that, receives the same expected rent as under costless
consolidation. In the Appendix, we verify that the agency cost postulated for the Cases
2 and 3 are also correct.
Finally, the organizational problem faced by the principal consists in finding the least
costly way of gathering information in the organization:
(P) : max
{(q,qˆ,q¯)}
V ∗(q, qˆ, q¯)− C(q, qˆ, q¯).
The presence of a fixed-cost of monitoring introduces several non-convexities in (P). This
leads a priori to various regimes with either Case 1, 2 or 3 being optimal, depending on the
size of this fixed-cost. The minimal cost paid for implementing a given schedule of outputs
(q, qˆ, q¯) results in fact from a choice among several technologies for getting information.
These technologies differ with respect to the fixed- and the marginal cost involved. The
fixed-cost is the cost of monitoring, the marginal cost is related to the information rent left
to the agents. If P wants to induce consolidation, he actually chooses a technology with
a high fixed-cost and a low marginal cost. Instead, if P wants arm’s length contracting,
he chooses a technology without any fixed-cost but with a high marginal cost.
In Case 1, outputs are the same as under costless consolidation. The corresponding
profit is nevertheless translated downwards because monitoring is now costly. Similarly,
the outputs and the principal’s profits in Case 3 are the same as under delegation. The
12As usual we write only the relevant constraints. Other incentive and participation constraints are
satisfied at the optimum as it can be checked ex post
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optimal outputs in Case 2 (referred thereafter as partial consolidation) are respectively
q∗(2θ), qˆC and q¯D and the principal’s profit is V ∗(q∗(2θ), qˆC , q¯D)−ν∆θ(νqˆC+2(1−ν)q¯D)−
νc. It is easy to show that V D < V PC = V ∗(q∗(2θ), qˆC , q¯D)−ν∆θ(νqˆC+2(1−ν)q¯D) < V C .
We have drawn on Figure 3 the different expressions of the principal’s expected profit
depending on c. The principal’s profit is the upper envelope of the three different linear
parts corresponding to his expected profit in the three different cases above.
Theorem 1 : There are three possible regimes for the principal’s problem:
• When c ∈ [0, c∗1] where c∗1 = V
C−V PC
1−ν the principal induces a consolidation between
the agents, the vector of outputs is thus (q∗(2θ), qˆC , q¯C);
• When c ∈ [c∗2,+∞[ where c∗2 = V
PC−V D
ν
> c∗1 the principal prefers arm’s length
contracting between the agents, the vector of outputs is (q∗(2θ), qˆD, q¯D);
• When c ∈ [c∗1, c∗2], the principal chooses to induce monitoring by A1 only when the
latter is efficient. There is partial consolidation, the vector of outputs is (q∗(2θ), qˆC , q¯D).
• Even though outputs are discontinuous functions of c, the principal’s payoff is con-
tinuously decreasing with c.
Theorem 1 shows that, as the fixed-cost of monitoring increases, the principal’s choice
goes from a consolidated organization to a partially consolidated one where only the
efficient agent A1 learns directly A2’s type to, finally arm’s length contracting. Actually,
the existence of the two extreme regimes is hardly surprising and the interest of Theorem
1 lies instead in the identification of the intermediate regime and more specifically in
the fact that efficient contractors are first to find it beneficial to consolidate. Intuitively,
those contractors produce at higher scales and enjoy more of the efficiency gains that
consolidation generates: this is the efficiency effect. This intermediate regime is also the
main predictive content of our theory of supplier networks. Qualitatively, its existence has
the following interpretation: more efficient contractors should monitor more intensively
their subcontractors even though efficiency in the productive activity has no direct impact
on efficiency in the monitoring activity.13 From an empirical point of view, the question is
thus not that much “do we observe partially consolidated networks ?” but rather “can we
explain differences in the monitoring intensities by differences in the productive efficiency
parameters of the contractors?”
Another important result of the optimization is that whereas optimal quantities are
constant within each regime, organizations do not adapt smoothly to improvements in
monitoring technologies but instead will jump discontinuously between three possibilities.
13We conjecture that this feature of our model is very robust to continuous generalizations of the
discrete assumptions (a continuum of production cost parameters or a continuum of monitoring efforts).
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As a result, the optimal organizational choices may not be robust to small perturbations
in the various parameters of the model. This suggests that even small improvements in
monitoring technology, maybe by means of new information technology or other organi-
zational innovations which facilitate information exchanges, might also be accompanied
by radical changes in prices, production and organizational forms. In particular, as mon-
itoring costs decrease, the chain of command is flattened.
Allocative efficiency is only one aspect of the overall comparison between both or-
ganizational forms. They also differ in the distribution of rents that they induce. This
has clearly an impact on incentives to make specific investments in the relationships in a
framework where those investments are non-verifiable and are only driven by the prospects
of getting information rents. Under consolidation, A1 is completely informed on the sub-
contractor and captures the whole surplus of the coalition. Only A1 may get a positive
rent and has thus incentives to make such a specific investment. Under delegation, both
agents receive instead the same positive rents and this more even distribution of rents
restores incentives for both. This suggests that our analysis may be possibly biased in
favor of consolidation when information structures are not endogenized.
To illustrate, consider the following bare-boned version of the model where S(q) = S.q
for some positive S and the possible output q can be either 0 or 1.14
By adapting our continuous formulation to that discrete case, it is straightforward
to show that one may find numerical values of S, θ and θ¯ such that qD = qˆD = 1 and
q¯D = 0 under delegation and qC = qˆC = 1 and q¯C = 0 under consolidation. Suppose
now that by investing an amount I ex ante, i.e., before contracting, agents improve the
probability of being efficient from ν to ν1 = ν+ ∆ν. These investments are non-verifiable
and non-observable and the only incentives for investment come from the agents’ prospects
for getting an information rent. Under delegation, both agents secure an expected rent
ν1.ν1∆θ. At a symmetric Nash equilibrium, they both invest whenever
ν1∆ν∆θ > I. (15)
Instead, under consolidation, the bottom agent gets no rent and never invests, keeping
the probability of being efficient at ν. The top agent invests whenever
∆ν(ν∆θ − c) > I. (16)
Under delegation, the firm’s expected profit can be written as:
V D = ν1(2− ν1)(S − 2θ)− 2ν1∆θ.
14This can be viewed as a modeling of the case where the top firm has to build up one large scale
project.
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Under consolidation, we have instead:
V C = (ν + ν1 − νν1)(S − 2θ)− ν1c− (ν + ν1 − νν1)∆θ.
There exist values of c and I such that (15), (16) and V D − V C > 0 are verified. This
means that delegation can finally be optimal when information structures are endogenous
and affected by ex ante investments.
This small model predicts also that consolidated organizations, when they emerge, are
characterized by a very asymmetric pattern of investments and by a decreasing expected
efficiency along the supply chain. Arm’s length contracting is characterized by a much
more symmetric distribution of costs between the different layers of the supply chain.
4 Comparison with Centralization
In this section, we compare the results obtained in Theorem 1 with what would occur in
a more centralized organization where P could contract with both suppliers directly. Our
aim here is first to get a better understanding of the losses and the possible systematic
bias coming from the delegation of the monitoring task. In particular, we will show that
when the monitoring activity is delegated, the optimal organization is tilted towards too
much arm’s length contracting. The second objective is to justify our focus on a three-
layer hierarchy in the first place. We show in Proposition 4 that once P is constrained
to delegate the monitoring task, there is no loss of control in delegating to A1 control on
A2 as soon as both suppliers would perfectly collude in a centralized organization. The
three-layer hierarchy performs as well as a centralized organization where the top firm
contracts directly with both suppliers.
• Centralization and Monitoring by the Principal
Suppose that the principal can perform the monitoring task by himself instead of
delegating this task to the contractor. We model thus a centralized organization where
the principal can directly monitor, communicate, and contract with the sub-contractor.
To keep the model as close as possible as before and in particular to allow for monitor-
ing conditional on A1’s type, the grand-contract works sequentially so that the principal
decides to monitor A2 or not as a function of A1’s report (which remains truthful in
equilibrium).
The optimal degree of monitoring is quite comparable to what is achieved with dele-
gated monitoring even though the cut-offs between the three regimes may change.
Proposition 2 : Suppose that the principal can monitor A2 at cost c and directly com-
municates and contracts with this supplier. Then, the principal is strictly better off than
15
if he delegates monitoring to A1 as long as the monitoring technology is used (see Figure
3). There exist again two threshold values cp1, and c
p
2 delimiting three intervals.
• When c ≤ cp1 = c∗1, the principal always monitors A2.
• When cp1 ≤ c ≤ cp2 with cp2 > c∗2 the principal monitors A2 if and only if A1 is
efficient.
• Finally, when c ≥ cp2 the principal acquires information indirectly by letting A2 report
his type directly to him. The same outcome as under delegation is implemented.
We already saw that, when the principal cannot retain control of the monitoring
task, choosing consolidation leaves to the contractor the possibility to better manipulate
reports to the principal on both his cost but also that of the sub-contractor. That joint
manipulation is no longer an issue when the sub-contractor is directly monitored by the
principal. This makes monitoring more attractive in the centralized organization than
when monitoring is delegated.
Note also that whether P has control over the monitoring task or not does not change
the threshold value between consolidation and partial consolidation. Indeed, the new
screening opportunities that that direct control offers to the principal (which concern the
mixed coalitions) do not influence the optimal quantity q¯, and determine the same cut-off
c∗1 = c
P
1 .
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Figure 3: The principal’s payoff.
However, the contractor may have a comparative advantage in monitoring other sup-
pliers so that the benefit of delegating that task still outweighs the cost of opening to the
contractor new strategic opportunities for manipulating information. The correct com-
parison is then between delegated monitoring with an efficient technology or keeping a
centralized organization but an inefficient monitoring device.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 suggests also that the principal may also benefit from
splitting the task of monitoring suppliers and production. Such separation reduces agency
costs by ensuring that the supervisor is unable to internalize all gains from manipulating
information. In the case of a productive supervisor, such gains always exist as our analysis
shows. As a matter of fact, that supervision and production should be split gives a
17
rationale to a large part of the literature on three-tier hierarchies which, following Tirole
(1986), assumes that supervisors do not produce. However, exactly as the contractor has a
comparative advantage over the top firm to perform monitoring, he is also likely to have a
comparative advantage over any other third-party not involved in the production process.
In the case of supplier networks, monitoring is facilitated by technological proximity,
justifying the fact that this task cannot be beneficially delegated to an outside agent.
• Centralization and Delegated Monitoring
Let us keep the assumption that the principal can communicate and contract with
the sub-contractor and let us now again assume that the task of monitoring is necessarily
delegated to the contractor. We are particularly interested in the possibility for the two
suppliers to collude to promote their collective profits against the top firm. Let us start
with a simple benchmark where this collusion does not take place.
Proposition 3 If the top firm can contract with both agents and prevent collusion between
them, then delegating monitoring to the contractor A1 is costless. The principal’s payoff
is the same as when he can monitor the other supplier A2 by himself.
In such an environment, the principal finds it costless to delegate monitoring to agent
A1. Indeed, the information obtained through monitoring, even though it is non-verifiable,
is shared by the two suppliers who do not cooperate. It is thus possible to build a
revelation mechanism15 to exploit this non-cooperative behavior and extract this piece
information costlessly. It is enough to have both suppliers reporting information on the
monitored agent’s cost and to compare those reports. If reports conflict, both agents
are heavily punished. With such a scheme, A2’s information can be costlessly extracted
by the principal just as if he had monitored himself. Moreover, the fact that the agents
can be punished for conflicting reports also provides costless incentives for A1 to exert
monitoring.
When collusion is an issue, such harsh punishments are not available to the principal
and delegating the monitoring task may be costly. To model this, suppose that at the
collusion stage, A1 has all bargaining power in offering an enforceable side-contract toA2.
16
The contractor faces almost the same design problem as in the case of the sub-contract
except that now, the reservation utility of agent A2 may not be zero but is instead fixed
by the initial grand-contract offered by the principal. While he had no influence on the
sub-contracting game examined in Sections 2 and 3, the principal might now use the
15See Maskin (1999).
16This collusion proposal takes place at date 4 in the timing of Figure 1 with date 1 corresponding to
a grand-contract offered to both agents. Note that keeping the same allocation of the bargaining power
in this collusion and in the official contract envisioned in the previous sections of the paper does not
introduce any bias in the analysis.
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grand-contract to distort side-contracting in his favor by playing on the sub-contractor’s
status quo payoff if he refuses to collude with the contractor.
Increasing the share of the coalitional surplus that the sub-contractor can always
guarantee himself reduces the contractor’s incentives to monitor because he can no longer
extract all the coalitional rent. As long as the principal wants some form of consolidation,
raising the sub-contractor’s status quo payoff should thus be costly. Building a centralized
mechanism which is collusion-proof and leaves the contractor with zero payoff should be
the best that can be done by the principal.
To confirm this intuition, we consider the same game as depicted in Section 2, except
that now, agent A1 must ensure that the sub-contractor gets utility Ur(θ2) where Ur(θ2) ≥
0 at the sub-contracting stage. This utility level is guaranteed by the principal through
some initial contract signed with the sub-contractor. The sub-contract must now satisfy,
the interim participation constraints of the sub-contractor:
y(θ1, θ)− θq(Φ(θ1, θ)) ≥ Ur(θ),
y(θ1, θ¯)− θ¯q(Φ(θ1, θ¯))) ≥ Ur(θ¯),
in addition to the usual incentive and participation constraints.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Ur(θ2) can be chosen by P . Then he optimally sets Ur(θ2) ≡
0 and gets the same payoff as in the three-layer hierarchy model.
This proposition is important because it validates our focus on a three-layer hierarchy
to analyze the incentives to consolidate. This seemingly decentralized organizational form
is nothing else that a possible implementation of the optimal centralized arrangement
when collusion is an issue.17
5 Conclusion
Our study of supplier networks outlines the importance of the monitoring aspect of the
contractor-subcontractor relationship. Information flows between suppliers, necessary to
enhance coordination, cannot be obtained without an active involvement by the contrac-
tor. As a consequence, the top firm must simultaneously shape the incentives for efficient
production and for efficient information sharing. It turns out that the intensity of moni-
toring depends of course on the monitoring costs (high intensity or consolidation for low
costs, low intensity or arm’s length contracting for high costs) but more interestingly
17On that issue, see also Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) who obtain a similar result in
a model where supervisory information is exogenous and not endogenized as here.
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also on the productive efficiency of the contractor. Through the efficiency effect a more
efficient contractor has more incentives to monitor.
By endogenizing these incentives, our model gives a unified treatment of a whole
literature on organizational design which either assumes that agents exogenously share
information and contract efficiently or do not share information and contract at arm’s
length under asymmetric information.
Several extensions of our work should be worth to pursue both on the empirical and
theoretical sides.
First, our analysis is certainly amenable to several empirical tests. The main testable
prediction of our model is certainly linked to the efficiency effect and the fact that the
intensity of monitoring should be positively correlated with the contractor’s efficiency
and profit. Consolidation should emerge for high production volumes whereas delegation
correspond to smaller scales of activities. It is also worth noticing that if one wants to
recover the distribution of the monitoring costs from observing organizational structures,
not taking into account the intermediate regime where consolidation may or may not
arise depending on the contractor’s efficiency would introduce a significant bias. Lastly,
extending our model to take into account specific investments which improve costs also
predicts that organizations where delegation appears will have a more symmetric pat-
tern of investments and efficiency whereas strong asymmetry may arise in consolidated
organizations.
On the theory side, it would be interesting to introduce more than two suppliers and
analyze the determinants of the clusters of consolidated activities. That extension could
be useful as a first step towards an incentive theory of networks.18 Adding multiple
contractors and sub-contractors may be useful to discuss the issue of competition at each
layer and how it affects networking.
Finally, while much of the early literature on organizational design, like our model, con-
centrates on Leontieff production functions, some recent papers (Mookherjee and Tsuma-
gari (2003) and Severinov (2003) most noticeably), stress the central role of this hypothesis
for the results concerning the superiority of consolidation and the equivalence between
delegation and direct contracting.19 Considering substitutes may change these proper-
ties. Our main results are nevertheless robust to a weakening of the Leontieff hypothesis.
To explain this, note, first, that in our model the fact that costless consolidation per-
forms better than delegation simply comes from the fact that coalitional virtual costs are
higher than coalitional true costs. When the principal faces a consolidation he must take
18See Kranton and Minehart (2000 and 2001) for models of network formation and its consequence on
specific investments. The issue of information and incentives is not modeled in those papers.
19See also Dana (1993) for a weakening of the perfect complement hypothesis.
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into account true costs while he must take into account virtual costs under delegation.
As it brings him higher profits to face lower costs (in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance), the principal prefers consolidation. Then, with a more general production
function, the qualitative features of the optimal contracting arrangement would remain
the same: consolidation for low monitoring costs, partial consolidation for an intermediate
range of values and delegation for high costs; however proving these results would involve
much more technicalities.
We hope to investigate some of these issues in future research.
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Appendix
• Proof of Proposition 1: Costless Consolidation:Under complete information
within the coalition, the following coalition incentive constraints must be satisfied to
induce information revelation:
u ≥ max{uˆ1 + ∆θqˆ1; uˆ2 + ∆θqˆ2; u¯+ 2∆θq¯}, (17)
uˆ1 ≥ max{uˆ2;u−∆θq; u¯+ ∆θq¯}, (18)
uˆ2 ≥ max{uˆ1;u−∆θq; u¯+ ∆θq¯}, (19)
u¯ ≥ max{uˆ1 −∆θqˆ1; uˆ2 −∆θqˆ2;u− 2∆θq}. (20)
Clearly (18) and (19) imply that the two mixed coalitions cannot be screened apart both
in terms of their aggregate payoffs uˆ1 = uˆ2 = uˆ, but also in terms of their respective
outputs20 qˆ1 = qˆ2 = qˆ. The two upward coalition incentive constraints give thus (1) and
(2). Participation constraints are written at the interim stage, knowing that agent A1
will capture all the coalitional rent, as (3) when A1 is inefficient and νu + (1 − ν)uˆ ≥ 0
when he is efficient. First, note that (1), (2) and (3) are binding since the principal wants
to reduce u, uˆ and u¯ as much as possible. This yields the following expressions for the
rents: u = ∆θqˆ+ν∆θq¯, uˆ = ν∆θq¯, u¯ = −(1−ν)∆θq¯. With those expressions, we directly
obtain (6) and UC > 0 since outputs are positive. Inserting those expressions into the
objective function and optimizing yields qC = q∗(2θ) and (7). We can now check that the
remaining coalition incentive constraints are satisfied.
Delegation: Consider the design of the optimal sub-contract. Fix A1’s type θ1. From
Maskin and Tirole (1990), everything happens as if θ1 were known by A2 at the sub-
contracting stage. Fixing P ’s grand-contract, an intermediate agent A1 with type θ1 finds
the optimal sub-contract as a solution to:
(PSC) : max
{(U2(θ1),Φ(θ1,θ));(U¯2(θ1),Φ(θ1,θ¯))}
ν(t(Φ(θ1, θ))− (θ1 + θ)q(Φ(θ1, θ))− U2(θ1))
+(1− ν)(t(Φ(θ1, θ¯))− (θ1 + θ¯)q(Φ(θ1, θ¯))− U¯2(θ1))
20To see this last point, note that qˆ1 and qˆ2 play a symmetric role in the incentive constraints (the
participation constraints are still missing but one can verify that qˆ1 and qˆ2 also play a symmetric
role in these constraints). If the contract (u, uˆ, uˆ, u¯, q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) satisfies these constraints, so does the
contract (u, uˆ, uˆ, u¯, q, qˆ2, qˆ1, q¯) which brings exactly the same payoff. The principal’s objective func-
tion being concave w.r.t. outputs, the principal can weakly increase his expected payoff by offering
(u, uˆ, uˆ, u¯, q, qˆ1+qˆ22 ,
qˆ1+qˆ2
2 , q¯).
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subject to
U2(θ1) = y(θ1, θ)− θq(Φ(θ1, θ)) ≥ y(θ1, θ¯)− θq(Φ(θ1, θ¯)), (21)
U¯2(θ1) = y(θ1, θ¯)− θ¯q(Φ(θ1, θ¯)) ≥ 0, (22)
where U2(θ1) (resp. U¯2(θ1)) is A2’s information rent when he is efficient (resp. inefficient)
and Φ(·) denotes the report function chosen by A1. Writing the conditions for optimality
of the null manipulation of reports (Φ∗(θ1, θ2) = (θ1, θ2) for all (θ1, θ2)) yields the following
coalition incentive constraints:
u ≥ max{uˆ1 + ∆θqˆ1; uˆ2 + ∆θqˆ2; u¯+ 2∆θq¯}, (23)
uˆ1 − ν
1− ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ max
{
uˆ2 − ν
1− ν∆θqˆ2;u−∆θq −
ν
1− ν∆θq; u¯+ ∆θq¯ −
ν
1− ν∆θq¯
}
,
(24)
uˆ2 ≥ max{uˆ1;u−∆θq; u¯+ ∆θq¯}, (25)
u¯− ν
1− ν∆θq¯ ≥ max
{
uˆ1 −∆θqˆ1 − ν
1− ν∆θqˆ1; uˆ2 −∆θqˆ2 −
ν
1− ν∆θqˆ2;u− 2∆θq −
ν
1− ν∆θq
}
.
(26)
Since he anticipates that he will have to leave some information rent to A2 if the latter is
efficient, A1’s participation constraints at the interim stage are:
U1 = ν(u−∆θqˆ1) + (1− ν)uˆ1 ≥ 0, (27)
U¯1 = ν(uˆ2 −∆θq¯) + (1− ν)u¯ ≥ 0. (28)
Consider the relaxed maximization program of the principal:
(PD′) : max
{(u,q);(uˆ1,qˆ1);(uˆ2,qˆ2);(u¯,q¯)}
ν2(S(q)− 2θq − u) + ν(1− ν)(S(qˆ1)− (θ + θ¯)qˆ1 − uˆ1)
+ν(1− ν)(S(qˆ2)− (θ + θ¯)qˆ2 − uˆ2) + (1− ν)2(S(q¯)− 2θ¯q¯ − u¯)
subject to u ≥ uˆ2 + ∆θqˆ2, uˆ2 ≤ uˆ1, uˆ1 − ν1−ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ u¯+ ∆θq¯ − ν1−ν∆θq¯, and (28).
Optimizing yields qˆD1 = qˆ
D
2 = qˆ
D, qD = q∗(2θ) and (9). We can verify now that all the
remaining constraints are satisfied and that we identified the solution of the principal’s
program.
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• Let us prove now that this contract is also optimal when P can contract with both
suppliers. If we denote by (ui, uˆi1, uˆ
i
2, u¯
i) the individual rent schedule of agent i in that sit-
uation (with obvious notations), we know that the following upward incentive constraints
are binding
νui + (1− ν)uˆii ≥ ν(uˆij + ∆θqˆj) + (1− ν)(u¯i + ∆θq¯). (29)
The inefficient type’s participation constraint also is binding
νuˆij + (1− ν)u¯i ≥ 0. (30)
The sum of the expected rents left by the principal is thus ν(ν∆θ(qˆ1 + qˆ2))+2(1−ν)ν∆θq¯,
which is the same value as in the delegation case. This leads to the same optimal quantity
schedule. Moreover, because (29) and (30) are binding, we can verify that the rent
schedules are also the same in both cases.
• Proof of Theorem 1
Derivation of C1(q, qˆ, q¯): First, note that a grand-contract must satisfy (17) to (20)
to induce information revelation from A1 once he has learnt A2’s type. Let us denote
by Φ˜(θ¯, ·) the maximand on the right-hand side of (13) and assume for the time being
that the implemented quantity and rent schedules are symmetric (i.e. qˆ1 = qˆ2 = qˆ and
uˆ1 = uˆ2 = uˆ). Using (19), we get Φ˜(θ¯, θ) = (θ¯, θ). Using (20), we obtain
u¯ ≥ uˆ−∆θqˆ ≥ uˆ−∆θqˆ − ν
1− ν∆θ(qˆ − q¯)
since q¯ ≤ qˆ. Similarly, u¯ ≥ u− 2∆θq ≥ u− 2∆θq− ν
1−ν∆θ(q− q¯) since q¯ ≤ q. Henceforth,
Φ˜(θ¯, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯). (13) rewrites as νuˆ+(1−ν)u¯−c ≥ ν(uˆ−∆θq¯)+(1−ν)u¯ and simplifying
yields condition (14).
Second, let us compute the maximands on the right-hand side of (12). We denote by
Φ˜(θ, ·) those maximands. From (17), Φ˜(θ, θ) = (θ, θ). Consider now a (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ¯)-
coalition. Note that uˆ− ν
1−ν∆θqˆ ≥ u−∆θq− ν1−ν∆θq, since uˆ ≥ u−∆θq and q ≥ qˆ. Hence
the only issue is to determine whether this mixed coalition says the truth or lies upward
(i.e., announces (θ¯, θ¯)). Equivalently to (12), we can write two moral hazard constraints,
each one corresponding to one report of this coalition: when the (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ¯)-coalition
tells the truth, the moral hazard constraint rewrites as νu+ (1− ν)uˆ− c ≥ ν(u−∆θqˆ) +
(1− ν)uˆ or
c ≤ ν∆θqˆ, (31)
when the (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ¯)-coalition lies upward, the moral hazard constraint rewrites as
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ− c ≥ ν(u−∆θq¯) + (1− ν)u¯, or
c ≤ ν∆θq¯ + (1− ν)(uˆ− u¯− q¯). (32)
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That is to say (12) implies (31) and (32), and (31) and (32) imply (12). Because qˆ ≥ q¯
and (2) holds, (31) and (32) are always verified when (14) holds.
Let us now derive C1(q, qˆ, q¯). As long as (12) is not binding, (1), (2) and (11) are
all binding to minimize C1. Therefore, C1(q, qˆ, q¯) = c + ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1 − ν)q¯) when c ≤
ν∆θq¯. Moreover, as long as we can neglect the moral hazard constraints (i.e. as long as
c ≤ ν∆θq¯C) we know from the study of the costless consolidation case that the principal
cannot do better with an asymmetric contract.
Derivation of C2(q, qˆ, q¯): Any incentive compatible grand-contract inducing moni-
toring only by the efficient type of A1 must be such that (17) and (18) (coalitions where
A1 is efficient) and (25) and (26) (coalitions where A1 is inefficient) hold together. Using
(18) and (25), we obtain immediately that uˆ1 = uˆ2 = uˆ. As qˆ1 and qˆ2 play a symmetric
role in all the relevant constraints of the program, there is no loss of generality in looking
for the optimal contract in the class of symmetric contracts such that qˆ1 = qˆ2.
Let us turn now to the moral hazard constraints. A1 must be induced to learn directly
information on A2 if and only if he is efficient. For the efficient type θ1 = θ, the moral
hazard constraint is still (12). For the inefficient type θ1 = θ¯, it is now:
νuˆ2 + (1− ν)u¯− ν∆θq¯ ≥ (33)
max
{Φ(θ¯,θ);Φ(θ¯,θ¯)}
{ν(t(Φ(θ¯, θ))− (θ + θ¯)q(Φ(θ¯, θ))) + (1− ν)(t(Φ(θ¯, θ¯))− 2θ¯q(Φ(θ¯, θ¯)))− c}.
At this stage, we cannot guess whether Φ∗(θ, θ¯) is equal to (θ, θ¯) or to (θ¯, θ¯). The
fact that the grand-contract is incentive compatible is not sufficient to conclude that the
contractor behaves truthfully even out of the equilibrium path. This lack of determination
only allows us to transform equation (12) into:
c ≤ min{ν∆θqˆ; ν∆θq¯ + (1− ν)(uˆ− u¯−∆θq¯)}. (34)
We now have to show that (33) can be written as
c ≥ ν∆θq¯ + max{0; (1− ν)(uˆ− u¯−∆θqˆ)}. (35)
Let us consider the r.h.s. of (33) and denote by Φ˜(θ¯, ·) its maximand. Due to the
symmetry of the optimal contract and to (18), we have necessarily Φ˜(θ¯, θ) = (θ¯, θ). A
coalition made of an inefficient A1 and an efficient A2 finds it optimal to tell the truth
even outside the equilibrium path. Φ˜(θ¯, θ¯) can instead take one of two values. As (24)
holds and qˆ ≤ q, we have uˆ−∆θqˆ− ν
1−ν∆θqˆ ≥ u−2∆θq− ν1−ν∆θq and the (θ¯, θ¯) coalition
prefers to report (θ¯, θ) than (θ, θ). The issue is then to know whether this coalition lies
downward and “locally” (i.e., says (θ¯, θ)) or tells the truth. To each case corresponds one
moral hazard constraint. Combining the two constraints obtained gives (35) .
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Let us now compute C2(q, qˆ, q¯). First note that as soon as c 6= ν∆θq¯, one of the moral
hazard constraints (34) or (35) must be binding, because if none is binding, one can
check that (1) is binding at the optimum and then (34) and (35) imply that c = ν∆θq¯.
When ν∆θqˆ > c > ν∆θq¯, (1) cannot be binding anymore and, as the principal wants
to reduce uˆ as much as possible, (34) must be the binding moral hazard constraint (if
(35) were binding, the principal could increase u¯ and decrease uˆ in such a way that the
implementation would be less costly for him). Thus when minimizing C2, the binding
constraints are (1), (5) and (34) (one can check ex post that all the other incentive and
participation constraints are satisfied): C2(q, qˆ, q¯) = νc+ ν∆θ(νqˆ + 2(1− ν)q¯).
Derivation of C3(q, qˆ, q¯): A grand-contract that prevents monitoring must satisfy
(23) to (26) to be delegation-proof. The moral hazard constraints are (33) for an inefficient
agent θ1 = θ¯ and
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ1 − ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ (36)
max
{Φ(θ,θ);Φ(θ,θ¯)}
{ν(t(Φ(θ, θ))− 2θq(Φ(θ, θ))) + (1− ν)(t(Φ(θ, θ¯))− (θ + θ¯)q(Φ(θ, θ¯)))− c}
for an efficient contractor θ1 = θ.
The r.h.s. of equation (36) corresponds to what an efficient contractor obtains if he
does learn directly A2’s type, minus the cost of this direct learning. Let us denote by
Φ˜(θ, .) the maximand of its r.h.s.. We infer from (23) that Φ˜(θ, θ) = (θ, θ), and from (25)
that Φ˜(θ, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ). Hence (36) can be written νu+(1−ν)uˆ1−ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ νu+(1−ν)uˆ2−c,
or after simplification c ≥ ν∆θqˆ1 + (1− ν)(uˆ2 − uˆ1).
Consider now equation (33). We know from the derivation of C2(q, qˆ, q¯) that it is
equivalent to the following constraints:
c ≥ max{ν∆θq¯; ν∆θq¯ + (1− ν)(uˆ1 −∆θqˆ1 − u¯); ν∆θq¯ + (1− ν)(uˆ2 −∆θqˆ2 − u¯)}.
We want to show that when c ≥ ν∆θqˆ1 +(1−ν)(uˆ2− uˆ1), this constraint is automatically
satisfied. For the first term, it comes from the fact that due to (25), ν∆θqˆ1 + (1 −
ν)(uˆ2 − uˆ1) ≥ ν∆θqˆ1 and due to (24) and (26), ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ ν∆θq¯. For the second one, we
already know that c ≥ ν∆θqˆ1 + (1 − ν)(uˆ2 − uˆ1) implies that c is higher than ν∆θqˆ1.
But due to constraint (26), we have (it is just another way to write the constraint):
ν∆θqˆ1 ≥ ν∆θq¯ + (1 − ν)(uˆ1 − ∆θqˆ1 − u¯). For the third one, we can use the fact that
qˆ2 ≥ qˆ1 and constraint (26) to obtain u¯− ν1−ν∆θq¯ ≥ uˆ1−∆θqˆ2− ν1−ν∆θqˆ1 or equivalently
ν∆θqˆ1 +(1−ν)(uˆ2− uˆ1) ≥ ν∆θq¯+(1−ν)(uˆ2−∆θqˆ2− u¯). Hence, we have shown that once
the agent is given the incentives not to learn directly information when he is efficient, he
has also no incentives to learn directly information when he is inefficient.
The condition c ≥ ν∆θqˆ1 + (1− ν)(uˆ2 − uˆ1) ensures that no moral hazard constraint
is binding and thus the agency cost is exactly the same as under delegation and given by
C3(q, qˆ, q¯) = 2ν∆θ(νqˆ + (1− ν)q¯).
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We are now ready to prove the proposition and the theorem. The only thing we have
to check is that the conditions on c used for the characterization of the different agency
costs are indeed verified when the principal optimally chooses between the three types
of organizations and contracts. Consider the situation where the principal induces direct
learning for both types of A1; the expression of C1(q, qˆ, q¯) valid if c ≤ ν∆θq¯C . Hence we
have to check that c∗1 ≤ ν∆θq¯C . After a quick reasoning, it is sufficient to show that the
following relations hold ν∆θq¯D ≤ c∗1 ≤ ν∆θq¯C , ν∆θqˆD ≤ c∗2 ≤ ν∆θqˆC and c∗1 ≤ c∗2.
Let us start by the last one. As q¯C verifies S ′(q¯C) = θ + θ¯ + ν
1−ν∆θ and qˆ
D verifies
S ′(qˆD) = 2θ¯ + ν
1−ν∆θ, for all values of the parameters q¯
C ≤ qˆD ; and the relation c∗1 ≤ c∗2
is just a consequence of the two other relations.
Consider now the relation ν∆θq¯D ≤ c∗1 ≤ ν∆θq¯C . To prove it we will proceed as
follows: when c is equal to ν∆θq¯D, we will prove that there exists a contract that satisfies
all the consolidation constraints21 and that brings to the principal the same payoff as
the optimal partial consolidation contract associated with this value of c. Hence it will
show that when c = ν∆θq¯D, the principal prefers to induce monitoring by both types and
ν∆θq¯D ≤ c∗1. Consider the following rent and quantity schedules:
q = q∗ u = ∆θ(qˆC + q¯D)
qˆ = qˆC uˆ = ∆θq¯D
q¯ = q¯D u¯ = 0.
It is the optimal schedule under partial consolidation and one can check that all the
consolidation constraints are satisfied (for c = ν∆θq¯D). As it is not the optimal contract
under consolidation, we can conclude that the principal can do better if he implements
monitoring by both types of A1. Consider the case c = ν∆θq¯
C and the following rent and
quantity schedules: 
q = q∗ u = ∆θ(qˆC + q¯C)
qˆ = qˆC uˆ = ∆θq¯C
q¯ = q¯C u¯ = 0.
It is the optimal contract under consolidation and it satisfies all the partial consolidation
constraints. We deduce that when c = ν∆θq¯C , the principal prefers to induce monitoring
only if A1 is efficient. We proved so far that ν∆θq¯
D ≤ c∗1 ≤ ν∆θq¯C . The proof of the
relation ν∆θqˆD ≤ c∗2 ≤ ν∆θqˆC follows exactly the same lines and is left to the reader.
21That is to say a contract that is incentive compatible and individually rational in the case where the
principal wants to induce monitoring by both types.
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Proofs which can be left on the Website
• Proof of Proposition 2: Let us use a superscript i to denote Ai’s utility. In this
setting, there are no moral hazard constraints. Suppose that the principal monitors A2
whatever A1’s report, the binding constraints are νuˆ
1
2 + (1− ν)u¯1 ≥ 0, νu1 + (1− ν)uˆ11 ≥
νuˆ12 + (1− ν)u¯1 + ν∆θqˆ2 + (1− ν)∆θq¯, u2 ≥ 0, uˆ21 ≥ 0, uˆ22 ≥ 0, and u¯2 ≥ 0. The expected
rent that the principal has to leave to A1 only is equal to ν∆θ(νqˆ2 + (1− ν)q¯). One can
replace this in the objective function and derive the first-order conditions. This gives
the following optimal quantity schedule indexed by a “P” meaning monitoring by the
principal: qP = q∗(2θ), qˆP1 = q
∗(θ + θ¯), qˆ2 = qˆD, and q¯P = q¯D. The principal’s payoff
function is linear in c with slope −1 as the principal has to pay c for the monitoring
activity. The efficiency losses are smaller than when P delegates monitoring as can be
seen from the expression of the rent left to the agents; the principal’s profit is thus
translated upward in this new situation (see Figure 3).
Suppose that the principal monitors A2 if and only if A1 is θ and reports truthfully
to be so. The binding constraints are νuˆ12 + (1− ν)u¯1 ≥ 0, νu1 + (1− ν)uˆ11 ≥ νuˆ12 + (1−
ν)u¯1 +ν∆θqˆ2 +(1−ν)∆θq¯, u2 ≥ 0, uˆ21 ≥ 0, uˆ22 ≥ u¯2 +∆θq¯, and u¯2 ≥ 0. The expected rent
that the principal must leave to the agents is now equal to ν∆θ(νqˆ2 + 2(1− ν)q¯) and the
optimal quantity schedule is then qP = q∗(2θ), qˆP1 = q
∗(θ+ θ¯), qˆP2 = qˆ
C , and q¯P = q¯D. The
principal’s payoff function is linear in c with slope −ν as the principal has to pay c, with
probability ν, in order to monitor A2. Again, compared to the delegated monitoring case,
the principal’s profit is translated upward, due to smaller efficiency losses (see Figure 3).
Suppose that the principal acquires information indirectly and relies on A2’s report to
do so. Then, we face the centralized structure and according to Proposition ?? the payoff
function of the principal is constant when c varies and is worth V D.
Clearly, with direct monitoring the principal can now distinguish between mixed
coalitions. Suppose that the principal wants to monitor A2 if and only if A1 reports
truthfully θ¯. The binding constraints are νuˆ12 + (1 − ν)u¯1 ≥ 0, νu1 + (1 − ν)uˆ11 ≥
νuˆ12 +(1−ν)u¯1 +ν∆θqˆ2 +(1−ν)∆θq¯, u2 ≥ uˆ21 +∆θqˆ1, uˆ21 ≥ 0, uˆ22 ≥ 0, and u¯2 ≥ 0. The ex-
pected rent that the principal must leave to the agents is equal to ν∆θ(νqˆ2+νqˆ1+(1−ν)q¯)
and the optimal quantity schedule is then qP = q∗(2θ), qˆP1 = qˆ
P
2 = qˆ
D and q¯P = q¯C . The
principal’s payoff function is linear in c with slope −(1 − ν). One can verify that when
c ≤ ν∆θqˆD , the principal can obtain a higher payoff by acquiring directly information
whatever is A1’s type rather than by acquiring directly information when A1 is θ¯ only.
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Moreover one can also verify that when c ≥ ν∆θq¯C , the principal can obtain a higher
22Consider the optimal contract when the principal decides to monitor A2 when A1 is θ¯. When
c ≤ ν∆θqˆD, if the principal always monitors, he can implement the same quantity schedule, give the
same rent to A1 and put A2 on his reservation value by setting u2 = 0. Doing so, he obtains a higher
payoff.
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payoff by acquiring indirectly information through contracting whatever is A1’s type. As
qˆD ≥ q¯C , we proved that the strategy “monitor if and only if A1 is θ¯” is never optimal.
The same kind of study as in the basic case permits to identify the threshold values.
The result c∗2 < c
p
2 comes from the fact that the payoff in case delegation is chosen is the
same in the two situations (monitoring by A1 or by P ), while the payoff in case of partial
consolidation is higher in case of monitoring by the principal. To obtain that c∗1 = c
p
1,
remark that in case of monitoring by the principal, the consolidation and partial consol-
idation schedules differ only with respect to the quantity produced by a (θ¯, θ¯) coalition
and that this quantity is the same as the corresponding quantity in case of monitoring by
agent A1.
• Proof of Proposition 3: As long as the principal does not want to use monitoring
himself (i.e. c ≥ cp2), he can guarantee himself the delegation payoff even if he had no
control on the monitoring activity. To do so, let us consider the following (symmetric)
transfers: t = θq∗(2θ) + ∆θqˆD, tˆ1 = θqˆD + ∆θq¯D, tˆ2 = θ¯qˆD, and t¯ = θ¯q¯D where tˆ1 (resp.
tˆ2) is offered to the efficient (resp. inefficient) agent in a mixed-coalition. It is easy to
check that those transfers and the outputs (q∗(2θ), qˆD, q¯D) yield rents UD and U¯D = 0 to
both agents. Moreover, the mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible, thus
A1 does not have any incentive to monitor A2.
Let us consider the more interesting case where A1 with type θ1 has to monitor. We
denote by ti(θˆ1, θˆ2, θ˜2) the transfer received by Ai(i = 1, 2) when A1 reports the whole
vector of types (θˆ1, θˆ2) and A2 reports θ˜2. The same notations follows for outputs. When
θˆ2 = θ˜2 we use the usual (equilibrium) definitions of transfers and outputs. Note first that
given that he monitors agent A1 prefers to reports the truth on A2 when t
1(θˆ1, θˆ2, θ˜2) =
−∞ for θˆ2 6= θ˜2. Similarly, with t2(θˆ1, θˆ2, θ˜2) = −∞ for θˆ2 6= θ˜2, A2 reports the truth on
his type at no cost for the principal. A2’s incentive constraints are trivially satisfied and
his participation constraints only remain. Everything happens thus as if the principal
had direct information on θ2. Moreover, if A1 does not monitor, either always saying
always θ˜2 = θ or θ˜2 = θ¯ exposes A1 to the risk that A2 has a different type. Given that
infinite punishments follow in that case, the moral hazard constraint is trivially satisfied
and remain only the participation constraints ν(t1 − θq) + (1− ν)(tˆ11 − θqˆ1)− c ≥ 0 for a
θ-agent A1 and ν(tˆ
1
2−θqˆ2)+(1−ν)(t¯1− θ¯q¯)− c ≥ 0 for a θ¯-agent A1. Everything happens
as if monitoring was verifiable by the principal.
•Proof of Proposition 4: Remark first that as Ur(θ2) is a reservation utility obtained by
A2 by playing optimally in a certain game, we must have Ur(θ¯) ≤ Ur(θ). Suppose that the
principal wants to induce monitoring whatever A1’s type. In that case, on the equilibrium
path the coalition will still reason under complete information and manipulating the
reservation utility of A2 will just change the participation constraints by making them
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more stringent. To see this point, let us denote by C1(Ur)(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) the implementation
cost corresponding to the quantity schedule (q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯). This cost minimizes the expected
rent of the coalition of agents, subject to (at least) the following constraints:
ν(uˆ2 − Ur(θ)) + (1− ν)(u¯− Ur(θ¯))− c ≥ 0 (37)
which says that a θ¯-A1 must expect a positive rent knowing that he will have to pay c for
the monitoring activity and let Ur(θ2) to A2, and the coalition incentive constraints (17)
to (20), which are written under complete information and are exactly the same as when
Ur ≡ 0. As (37) is more stringent than (3) as soon as Ur(θ) > 0 or Ur(θ¯) > 0, we can
already deduce that C1(Ur) ≥ C1(0) = C1 when c ≤ c∗1 because in that case constraints
(17) to (20) and (3) are the only relevant constraints when computing C1(0). If P wants
to induce monitoring and c ≤ c∗1 then he can optimally set Ur ≡ 0.
Let us turn to the situation in which P wants to induce partial monitoring (monitor-
ing if and only if A1 is efficient) and reason over C2(Ur)(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) the implementation
cost corresponding to the quantity schedule (q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯). There will be different cases
depending on whether Ur(θ)− Ur(θ¯) > ∆θq¯ or not.
Suppose Ur(θ)−Ur(θ¯) ≤ ∆θq¯, the binding constraints in the program of agent A1 when
proposing a sub-contract to A2 are the same as when Ur ≡ 0: virtual cost parameters
are thus the same. If θ1 = θ, coalition incentive constraints are written under complete
information (see constraints (17) and (18)) and if θ1 = θ¯, the reservation utility profile of
agent A2 ensures that there are no countervailing incentive effects and coalition incentive
constraints take into account the standard virtual cost (see constraints (25) and (26)).
From (18)) and (25) we can obtain that uˆ1 = uˆ2 = uˆ and from (17) that the rent schedule
must satisfy
u ≥ uˆ+ ∆θmax{qˆ1; qˆ2}. (38)
We must also consider the participation constraints coming from this subcontracting game:
in particular, because an inefficient A1 must expect a positive rent, we must have:
ν(uˆ−∆θq¯) + (1− ν)(u¯− Ur(θ¯)) ≥ 0, (39)
instead of (28) with the former being more stringent. When Ur ≡ 0 and c∗1 ≤ c ≤
c∗2, C2 was computed by taking into account these coalition incentive and participation
constraints, plus a moral hazard constraint corresponding to the fact that a θ-A1 must
not prefer to save on the monitoring cost and rely on indirect learning. After such a
deviation, A1 could in particular lie and set Φ(θ, θ) = (θ, θ) and Φ(θ, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯). This
gives the following constraint:
c ≤ ν(Ur(θ¯)− Ur(θ)) + ν∆θq¯ + (1− ν)(uˆ− u¯−∆θq¯), (40)
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which corresponds to the only relevant moral hazard constraint when Ur ≡ 0. Combining
(38), (39) and (40) we can deduce a lower bound on the expected rent left to the agents
and thus on the implementation cost C2(Ur):
C2(Ur)((q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) ≥ νc+ ν∆θ(ν max{qˆ1; qˆ2}+ 2(1− ν)q¯) + ν2Ur(θ) + (1− ν − ν2)Ur(θ¯),
and as Ur(θ) ≥ Ur(θ¯) there is no way to fix Ur in such a way that the implementation
cost is lower than when Ur ≡ 0. This analysis holds whenever c∗1 ≤ c ≤ c∗2.
Suppose now that Ur(θ) − Ur(θ¯) > ∆θq¯. In that case, virtual cost parameters may
have changed. However, we can still write a lower bound on the implementation cost.
First remark that a θ¯-agent A1 must expect a positive rent :
νuˆ2 + (1− ν)u¯ ≥ νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯) > ν∆θq¯.
Next, a θ-A1 must prefer to invest c and tell the truth rather than propose an incentive
contract to A2 and lie. In particular, we must have :
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ1 − c− (νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯)) ≥
ν∆θqˆ2 + (1− ν)∆θq¯ + νuˆ2 + (1− ν)u¯− (νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯)),
where the right hand side is what A1 obtains if he sets Φ(θ, θ) = (θ¯, θ), Φ(θ, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯)
and rely on arm’s length contracting, and
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ1 − c− (νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯)) ≥
ν∆θqˆ1 + (1− ν)∆θq¯ + νuˆ1 + (1− ν)u¯− (νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯)),
where the right hand side is what A1 obtains if he announces (θ, θ¯) instead of (θ, θ) and
(θ¯, θ¯) instead of (θ, θ¯). Now, using the fact that due to the incentive constraints uˆ1 ≥ uˆ2,
we can write:
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ1 ≥ c+ νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯) + ν∆θmax{qˆ1, qˆ2}+ (1− ν)q¯,
so that the implementation cost C2(Ur) (which is the overall rent that P must let to the
agents) verifies
C2(Ur)((q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) ≥ νc+ ν∆θ(max{qˆ1, qˆ2}+ 2(1− ν)q¯).
Choosing Ur 6≡ 0 is dominated.
Let us turn to the situation where P wants to induce arm’s length contracting. We
denote C3(Ur)(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) the implementation cost corresponding to the quantity schedule
(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯). Suppose first that Ur(θ)− Ur(θ¯) ≤ ∆θq¯. In that case, as argued before, the
virtual costs that must be taken into account in the coalition incentive constraints are
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the same as if Ur ≡ 0 because there are no countervailing incentive effects. The initial
contract must satisfy (23) to (26) and an inefficient agent A1 must expect a positive rent:
ν(uˆ2−∆θq¯) + (1− ν)(u¯−Ur(θ¯)) ≥ 0 (which is relaxed when one decreases Ur(θ¯)). When
Ur ≡ 0, we know that these are the only relevant constraints to determine C3, as long as
c ≥ c∗2. Thus we can conclude that Ur 6≡ 0 cannot reduce the implementation cost and
does not allow the principal to get a higher profit than V D (the profit in the delegation
case).
Suppose now that ∆θqˆ1 ≥ Ur(θ)−Ur(θ¯) > ∆θq¯. In that case, there are no countervail-
ing incentives when A1 is efficient: constraints (23) and (24) must hold. There are some
countervailing incentives when A1 is inefficient, but we can nevertheless write that such
an agent must expect a positive rent, i.e. νuˆ2 + (1− ν)u¯ ≥ νUr(θ) + (1− ν)Ur(θ¯) > ∆θq¯.
From (23) we know that u ≥ uˆ2 +∆θqˆ2, and from (24) that uˆ1 ≥ u¯+∆θq¯+ ν1−ν∆θ(qˆ1− q¯).
Hence we can write a lower bound for the implementation cost:
C3(Ur)(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) ≥ ν∆θ(νqˆ1 + νqˆ2 + 2(1− ν)q¯).
Hence C3(Ur) ≥ C3(0).
Finally, suppose that Ur(θ) − Ur(θ¯) > ∆θqˆ1. In that case there are countervailing
incentives whatever A1’s type. From the fact that an inefficient A1 must expect a positive
rent we know that νuˆ2 + (1 − ν)u¯ ≥ νUr(θ) + (1 − ν)Ur(θ¯) > ∆θqˆ1. Now consider an
efficient A1. If he sets Φ(θ, θ) = (θ¯, θ), Φ(θ, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯), he will just have to leave the rent
schedule Ur to A2 and thus obtain the rent ν(uˆ2 +∆θqˆ2−Ur(θ))+(1−ν)(u¯+∆θq¯−Ur(θ¯)).
In order to prevent that deviation, P must guarantee
νu+ (1− ν)uˆ1− νUr(θ)− (1− ν)Ur(θ¯) ≥ ν(uˆ2 + ∆θqˆ2−Ur(θ)) + (1− ν)(u¯+ ∆θq¯−Ur(θ¯)),
combining this inequality with the rent he must left to an inefficient A1 gives a lower
bound on the implementation cost:
C3(Ur)(q, qˆ1, qˆ2, q¯) ≥ ν∆θ(νqˆ1 + νqˆ2 + (1− ν)(qˆ1 + q¯)).
Because qˆ1 ≥ q¯, we obtain the desired result.
Gathering all the cases studied yields Proposition 4.
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